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11. Introduction
As part of the structural adjustment program of the 1980s and the 1990s, many sub-Saharan countries
have liberalized their economies and developed poverty reduction strategies that are intended to open
new market-led opportunities for economic growth. However, market liberalization – expected to
facilitate the functioning and effectiveness of markets – have had mixed results (eg, Jayne and Jones
1997; Winter-Nelson and Temu 2002; Dorward and Kydd 2004; Fafchamps 2004). Moreover,
successful implementation of structural adjustments for poverty reduction requires, among others,
good infrastructure and diversified agriculture (Kydd and Dorward 2004; Dorward et al. 2004b;
Dorward et al. 2005). Lack of such economic transformation after liberalization has been attributed to
factors such as partial implementation of reforms and policy reversals (eg, Jayne et al. 2002; Kherallah
et al. 2000; Jayne and Jones 1997) and lack of strong institutions that support market and private
sector development (World Bank 2002a and 2003). In areas with limited market infrastructure, the
argument for lack of economic transformation of agriculture towards more commercialized
production is strongly embedded in the lack of incentives for private sector investment and the need
for proper institutions to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the state.
Nonetheless, liberalization has opened a window of opportunity for smallholder producers hitherto
growing diverse products and supplying small surpluses to markets. The removal of trade barriers and
increased competition has opened some flexibility for farmers to choose buyers for their products and
suppliers of key inputs. But high transaction costs and problems of asymmetric information continue to
bedevil smallholder farmers, especially those with poor access to markets for products, inputs and
services. Lack of access to market infrastructure and geographical isolation either due to remoteness or
poor roads and poor communication systems limit the development of markets. Hence, smallholder
producers in these areas are poorly served by agricultural traders, making local markets thin, less
competitive and prices highly dependent on seasons: falling sharply at the time of harvest and increasing
gradually as local supply declines. The lack of competition among buyers, low local effective demand and
covariate risks limit opportunities for farmers to bargain for better prices, which leaves them to accept
low prices for their produce (de Janvry et al. 1991; Kindness and Gordon 2001).
Along the market and value chain, processors and traders are constrained by low quality grain,
inadequate supply and high cleaning costs whereas market intermediaries in the supply chain face high
assembly costs, high market risk and cash flow problems. These factors deprive farmers the
underlying incentives to produce and supply quality and differentiated products with desirable
market traits in addition to their inability to penetrate high value niche markets (Jones et al. 2002).
This indicates that small-scale, dispersed and unorganized producers are unlikely to exploit market
opportunities as they cannot attain the necessary economies of scale and lack bargaining power in
negotiating prices. This reduces their ability to compete with well established large scale producers
and farmers in more-favored areas to harness available and emerging market opportunities (Johnson
and Berdegue 2004). One viable strategy for such producers would be to evolve new collective forms
of organization that would help them reduce transaction costs and benefit from better bargaining
power in marketing their produce and procuring production inputs.
Producer or farmer organizations refer to the various forms of organizations that perform diverse
functions such as analysis, advocacy, economic (production and marketing) and local development
(Stockbridge et al. 2003). They are grounded on the principle of collective action among potential
beneficiaries. Collective action occurs when individuals voluntarily cooperate as a group and
coordinate their behavior in solving a common problem. In broad terms, collective action may be
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2defined as action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit
of members’ perceived shared interest (Marshall 1998), which fits well in the traditional African
setting. In the absence of well functioning markets, African farmers have traditionally relied on
kinship and other forms of reciprocal relationships in production, marketing and other social activities
(Fafchamps and Minten 1999; Gabre-Madhin 2001). There is a potential that such informal
institutions and relationships can form the basis for enhancing market access and entrepreneurial skills
through collective action. However, collective action in marketing requires closer coordination of
production and postharvest activities to ensure delivery of high quality and homogeneous products.
Moreover, new forms of organization among small and spatially dispersed producers involve
transaction costs and require good leadership and development of new skills in business and agro-
enterprise development. The negative experiences of cooperatives in the past attest to the importance
of these factors in farmer organization, management and resilience (Lele 1981).
If new forms of organization and market institutions are going to help reduce transaction costs and
enhance market opportunities for the poor, there is a need to understand how such collective action
evolves and how it is sustained; the determinants of farmer participation; alternative forms of
organization that may enhance performance and effectiveness; and the complementary institutions
and the policy support needed for the effectiveness of collective marketing groups.
This paper aims to review the conceptual issues surrounding imperfect markets in smallholder
agriculture and the role that institutional and organizational innovations can play in improving the
performance of rural markets. With a case study of producer marketing groups in eastern Kenya, the
paper offers new insights on the potentials and constraints of rural institutions in providing market
services. The analysis highlights marketing outcomes and the potential sources of differential success
of marketing groups in relation to marketing and other stated functions. The paper is organized as
follows: Section 1 introduces the background; and Section 2 reviews market institutions and their
emerging roles in remedying market imperfections or failures in rural areas. Section 3 outlines the
methodological approach used in the case study. Section 4 discusses the key results, while Section 5
presents analyses of policy and institutional issues that affect the development of collective marketing
groups. The main lessons and policy conclusions are found in the concluding section.
2. Institutions for improving markets
2.1. Market imperfection and the role of institutions
Institutions are defined in many different ways. The most widely quoted one is by North (1990)
which defines institutions as humanly devised constraints, made up of formal constraints (ie, rules,
laws, constitutions), informal constraints (ie, norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed codes
of conduct) that structure human interactions, and their enforcement characteristics. These
constraints and the technology employed determine the transaction and transformation costs that add
up to the production and marketing costs. Following North (1990), Dorward et al. (2005) define
institutions as “rules of the game” that define the incentives and sanctions affecting people’s behavior
and distinguish institutional arrangement as sets of rules and structures that govern particular
contracts, and the context within which the contracts are governed. The World Bank (2002a) offers a
working definition of institutions as rules, enforcement mechanisms and organizations that promote
market transactions. These definitions indicate that institutions provide multiple functions to
markets; they transmit information, mediate transactions, facilitate the transfer and enforcement of
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3property rights and contracts, and manage the degree of competition. Along with these concepts, we
define market institutions as rules of the game, enforcement mechanisms and organizations that
facilitate market interaction, coordination, contract formation and enforcement.
Market failures are caused by asymmetric information, high transaction costs and imperfectly
specified property rights. These market deficiencies are more pronounced in rural areas with under-
developed road and communication networks and other market infrastructure. Where supporting
market institutions are lacking, rural markets in areas with low market infrastructure tend to be very
thin and imperfect. In the absence of institutions that help to coordinate marketing functions or to
link producers to markets, the associated high transportation costs and transaction costs undermine
the processes of exchange (Kranton 1996; Gabre-Madhin 2001) and result in limited or localized
markets with little rural-urban linkages (Chowdhury et al. 2005). In such circumstances, households
produce only a limited range of goods and services for their own consumption because social
protection for food security is not provided through markets and government interventions (de Janvry
et al. 1991). Shocks and vulnerability to production risk (ie, weather, pests and sickness) and market
risk (ie, price) that seem systemic to agriculture also lead to imperfect markets and transaction
failures (Dorward and Kydd 2004).
When high transaction costs, asymmetric information and incomplete property rights impede the
functioning of markets, market players fail to undertake profitable investments (due to the absence of
complementary investments) leading to coordination failures that hinder market functions (Dorward et al.
2003; Dorward et al. 2005; Poulton et al. 2006). Thus coordination failure along the production-to-
consumption value chain may explain constrained agricultural development and the prevalence of a low
equilibrium trap1, which is a big challenge to policy (Dorward et al. 2003). Overcoming the effects of such
market imperfections in agricultural input and output markets would therefore require a deliberate
attempt to strengthen institutions that promote coordination of market functions, reduce transaction costs
and integrate markets to facilitate a continual transition to a higher level equilibrium (World Bank 2002b).
Various private and public sector market-supporting institutions and institutional arrangements have
been proposed to bridge market imperfections, reduce transaction costs, enhance opportunities for
the poor in markets and to make the market systems more inclusive and integrated (World Bank
2002a). Among the potential market-supporting institutions can that enhance market functions in
rural areas are farmer organizations such as Producer Marketing Groups (PMGs). Their potential in
this process lies in enabling contractual links to input and output markets (Coulter et al. 1999);
promoting economic coordination in liberalized markets (Rondot and Collion 1999); and in leveraging
market functions for smallholder farmers. However, their success in this process depends on their
ability in conveying market information; coordinating marketing functions; defining and enforcing
property rights and contracts; facilitating smallholder competitiveness in markets (World Bank
2002a), and more critically in mobilizing their members to engage in markets.
2.3. Farmer organizations and marketing
Historically, farmer cooperatives were introduced in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the colonial period
for the purpose of promoting production of cash crops by peasant farmers (Hussi et al. 1993). After
independence, many governments as well as donors promoted cooperatives and other rural organizations as
1 The low equilibrium trap is a steady state situation resulting from low levels of investment that tend to sustain imperfect markets and
poverty (Hoff 2001).
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4a potential source of decentralized grassroots participation in agricultural credit, input and commodity
markets (Lele and Christiansen 1989; Hussi et al. 1993). Their performances were mixed. In Kenya, for
example, semi-autonomous agencies – such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), and the
coffee and dairy cooperatives – were important to the growth of smallholder production, while some
parastatals and cooperatives showed mediocre record. The mediocre performances were attributable to
technological problems and poor management (Wolf 1986; Lele and Christiansen 1989)
Generally, the performance of farmer cooperatives in relation to poverty reduction and provision of
essential services has not been exemplary (Lele 1981; Hussi et al. 1993; Akwabi-Ameyaw 1997).
Supported by governments, they functioned primarily as service cooperatives rather than as business
enterprises owned and managed by the members. They were not allowed sufficient marketing
margins to cover their operational expenses and could, therefore, not evolve into commercially viable
enterprises. This compromised their inherent character as member-controlled organizations which in
turn discouraged member participation and eroded confidence in the leadership. With structural
adjustment and economic reforms, many of the service cooperatives lost their special protection from
the state, which further reduced their viability in the ensuing competitive environment (Lele 1981).
For cooperatives and rural organizations to be effective in serving a broad set of socio-political and
economic objectives of small producers, new policies and institutional reforms are needed to facilitate
their transformation from public sector service providers to private sector enterprises with clear
business plans. With hindsight, farmer organizations tend to succeed only when: farmers can manage
them autonomously with minimal government interference; farmers participate actively in decision-
making at every stage of the process; and their cooperative activities are profitable (World Bank 1995).
A strong justification for farmer organizations is their potential to play a critical role in both the delivery
and coordination of services to smallholder producers (Dorward et al. 2004b). They can facilitate
collective marketing of agricultural outputs that will help reduce transaction costs related to the
marketing of agricultural inputs and small marketable surplus emanating from a large number of widely
dispersed small producers. Collective marketing allows small-scale farmers to spread the costs of
marketing, enhance their ability to negotiate for better prices, and improve their market power.
Furthermore, climatic variability in semi-arid areas increases the variability of supply and prices because
effective demand is limited, and small-scale farmers are often unable to sell to consumers outside of
their local markets. Through coordination of marketing activities, PMGs could facilitate access to better
markets, reduce marketing costs, and synchronize buying and selling practices to seasonal price
conditions. PMGs can shorten the marketing chains by linking producers more directly to the upper end
of the marketing chain (Figure 1). Well organized farmers will be able to bypass brokers or assemblers,
rural wholesalers and transporters who now procure grain directly from farmers, and connect directly
with the urban high value retailers and processors or exporters. This can be done through various
contractual arrangements, including outgrower schemes or postharvest bulk delivery
In many rural areas, commercial inputs are either unaffordable or smallholder farmers face high
transaction costs, which further undermines their ability to use such inputs. The high input costs for
small quantities resulting from high transaction and transportation costs are likely to make
investments in commercial inputs uneconomical to many smallholder farmers. Farmer marketing
groups can however facilitate input and output markets access and service delivery, thus promoting
commercial activities and technological change in agriculture (Kindness and Gordon 2001). However,
for these organizations to be beneficial to farmers, governments need to provide complimentary
public goods that would empower small producers to participate in markets (Kelly et al. 2003).
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52.4. Evolution and development of farmer marketing groups
Farmer marketing groups as an outcome of collective action are unlikely to emerge on their own
(Johnson et al. 2002). The need for collective action depends on the resource type, degree of spatial
integration and the time required in achieving the desired outcomes. Controlling for conducive
environment and political leaderships, White and Runge (1995) have shown that groups will emerge
and survive where a “critical mass” of individuals have practical knowledge of the potential gains from
collective action, but that in the short term emergence can be constrained by landscape factors that
affect the potential net gain, and socio-cultural factors that influence the cost of constructing the new
institution. It follows therefore that both micro and macro factors are important determinants of the
evolution and the need for collective action. Additionally, an individual’s choice to participate in
collective action will depend on his/her expectation of other members’ behavior.
Collective action in marketing is likely to occur if expected benefits from lower business transaction
costs, better prices for inputs and outputs and/or empowerment and capacity enhancement outweigh
the associated costs of complying with collective rules and norms. If the expected cooperation
Figure 1. Marketing channels and value chains for grains and the role of PMGs.
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6benefits are lower than the expected costs, households are unlikely to participate in group marketing
activities. Successful collective action based on membership will, therefore, depend on the potential
that group action will improve the members’ expected net benefit streams above and beyond what
can be achieved without such collective action. In semi-arid areas where spatially dispersed farm
households produce small quantities for markets, individual net gain from collective marketing is
likely to be low and unlikely to outweigh the costs unless the size of the group is large enough to
minimize unit costs. This observation points to the fundamental role of improving agricultural
productivity and reducing production risk in these areas so as to create opportunities for market
development.
Nevertheless, the costs and benefits are likely to differ across households depending on location,
volume of production, asset endowment, education and managerial skills (Staal et al. 1997; Hollway
and Ehui 2002; Kerr et al. 2002). Since the benefits of farmer marketing groups are unlikely to be
equally distributed, some households may not find them useful unless some interventions are
designed to enhance their participation – suggesting that individual participation in farmer
organizations is an endogenous process that may vary across households.
The potential for accessing essential services to improve agricultural incomes and tapping economic
opportunities will act as a strong incentive for anyone contemplating membership. Existing skills/
experience of members in relation to what is required to undertake joint activities; internal cohesion
and membership driven agenda; and the ability to effectively integrate into a wider commercial
economy will determine the effectiveness of collective marketing activities (Stringfellow et al. 1997).
This implies that measures designed to enhance farmer marketing group capacities will contribute to
the success of producer marketing groups. Therefore programs that are geared towards facilitating
groups’ self reliance and enhancing organizational and management skills are likely to equip groups
with the capacity to forge effective business interactions with the private sector for agricultural
development (Bingen et al. 2003).
Despite the potential gains from collective action, individual cooperative behavior may not be
translated into collective action unless other potential beneficiaries agree to cooperate and do
likewise. The presence and assurance of trust between and among individuals facilitates the potential
for reciprocity and emergence of cooperative behavior (Runge 1981; White and Runge 1995). It
follows, thus, that interventions which enhance trust among members in a group, including laws of
engagement and operational democracy, are likely to contribute to successful collective action. The
functional orientation of farmer groups and their internal features are also important determinants of
the success of farmer organizations (Coulter et al. 1999). Larger groups may be less successful than
small groups in furthering their interest but only up to a certain level. This is mainly because the
transaction and managerial costs of cooperation increase faster than the gains as group size increases
beyond a certain level (Hussi et al. 1993), which means that optimal group size will depend on the
type of activity and the features of the group.
3. The case study
In order to examine the relevance of the above reviewed conceptual issues and assess the constraints
and opportunities for farmer organizations to facilitate market access for the poor, a study was
conducted in two districts of eastern Kenya (Mbeere and Makueni). The two districts are located in
part of the larger semi-arid lands where market infrastructure is poor (Appendix 1) and farmers
produce limited marketable surplus. They are characterized by low density paved roads and limited
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7access to major marketing centers. Although climatic variability is a typical characteristic of these
areas with recurrent droughts, smallholder agriculture is almost entirely dependent on rains.
Appendix 1. Producer marketing groups (PMGs) study sites in Kenya.
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8The study capitalizes on two rounds of data sets collected in the two districts: a baseline and a follow-up
survey. The baseline survey of 400 households (240 in Mbeere and 160 in Makueni) was undertaken in
2003 before the PMGs were formed as part of a research project that aimed to test alternative
institutional arrangements for improving market access for smallholders. The households were randomly
sampled from a list of all households in the targeted villages. Farmers were sensitized and assisted2 to
form PMGs with the view to test the potential of these groups to improve market access for small
farmers. Communities managed to voluntarily establish five PMGs in each of the two districts.
Consequently, the groups were formally registered and provided a certificate of legal constitution issued
by the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. After registration some of the households who had
expressed interest in joining the groups decided not join. From the initial sample of 400 households, the
distribution of members and non-members was decided later, after the PMGs were established with
committed members who paid the registration fees and/or annual contributions to the group (Table 1).
Information collected during the baseline survey included poverty indicators; production levels of
dryland crops; market participation by households; and adoption of agricultural technologies.
During the follow-up survey conducted in 2005, data were collected at three levels: the community or
village, the PMG and the farm household. At the community or village level, a total of 20 communities/
villages (two from each PMG) were purposively selected for the survey based on villages that had the
highest number of registered members in their respective PMGs. Thereafter, a group of about nine
gender-balanced key informants were selected from each village based on peer perception and the village
chief ’s advice on their ability to provide quality information about the village. A semi-structured
questionnaire was administered to the informants to obtain data on demographic and resource use,
socioeconomic conditions, trends and the overall economic profiles of the PMG villages. At the PMG
2 The form of assistance provided included bringing the farmers together to discuss production and marketing strategies for dryland
legumes; to identify production and marketing constraints and opportunities; training in quality seed production and marketing; and
provision of information in organizing marketing groups. No direct subsidies or incentives were provided to farmers to join groups.
Table 1. Household sampling and sample sizes for 2003 and 2005 surveys.
Total# Members Non-members
District PMG 2003 2005 2003# 2005 2003# 2005
Mbeere Kamwiyendeyi 80 50 58 30 22 20
Kilia 80 50 45 30 35 20
Makima 80 50 31 30 49 20
Nthingini* - 30 - 20 - 10
Wango* - 30 - 20 - 10
Makueni Thavu 80 50 43 30 37 20
Emali 80 50 58 30 22 20
Kathonzweni* - 30 - 20 - 10
Kampi Ya Mawe* - 30 - 20 - 10
Kalamba* - 30 - 20 - 10
Total 400 400 235 250 165 150
*A baseline survey was not conducted in these PMG villages in 2003 because they were included in the project only after the
survey was conducted in the initial five target villages.
# The number of PMG members in 2003 is based on later classification of the baseline data into PMG members and non-members
after the PMGs were clearly established. The 2005 survey covered all the PMG villages and sampled from members and non-
members.
Source: Household surveys (2003 and 2005).
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9level, all the ten PMGs were surveyed separately. Based on advice from community elders and the village
chief, a group of five to seven respondents comprising of PMG management and ordinary members were
selected from each PMG as key informants. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered to obtain
data on the objectives and aspirations of the groups when they were formed; general group
characteristics (eg, size and composition, frequency of meetings and capital); asset ownership (eg, store,
weighing scales and operating capital); credit access; bulking and marketing; governance; major
constraints limiting group performance and planned activities.
At the household level, data were collected on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, crop
and livestock production and marketing activities, household assets, credit and savings, access to
information and participation in collective marketing or awareness of collective marketing groups and
perception of anticipated benefits among non-members. A total of 400 randomly selected households
in the PMG villages, comprising of 250 members and 150 non PMG members, were surveyed (210
from Mbeere district and 190 from Makueni district). These 400 randomly selected households
included 250 households from the baseline survey3.
The primary data were subjected to qualitative and quantitative analyses. Simple descriptive statistics
were used to analyze the socioeconomic and biophysical profiles of the PMG villages. In particular,
they were used to assess the prevalence and levels of poverty, market participation and resource
management conditions in the PMG villages. The PMG data were analyzed to understand market
functions and performance of PMGs; to determine governance problems and the level of collective
action; to identify indicators of collective action; and the effectiveness of collective action in
marketing functions and the associated factors that affect group performance. Household data were
used to examine the marketing channels and market actors along the value chain, and to establish the
market shares, volumes and prices offered by different agents to farmers. An econometric model was
estimated to determine factors that influence unit price of point transactions; to establish whether
prices offered to smallholder farmers by different market participants and particularly by the PMGs,
controlling for other factors, would be significantly different; and to test whether PMGs pay higher
mean prices with lower variance than other buyers.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Socioeconomic profiles of PMG villages
The overall level of market access in the PMG villages is very poor. The level of accessibility is
relatively good during the dry seasons but the roads are usually impassable during the rainy season.
The average distance from the PMG stores to the nearest market was about 9 km and ranged between
0 km (eg, Makima and Kathonzweni) to 20 km (eg, Kilia), while the distance from the PMG stores to
the district commercial centre was between 11 km for Kampi Ya Mawe (KYM) and 150 km for
Nthingini (Table 2 and Appendix 1). This confirms the high level of transportation costs and
transaction costs faced by small producers in this area.
The proportion of households that produced surplus cereals and legumes were generally higher in
Mbeere district than in Makueni. However, the proportion of households that produced surplus
3 This sub-sample consists of 150 households re-sampled from 235 baseline households that had remained PMG members and 100
households re-sampled from 165 households that had remained non-PMG members (see Table 1). The panel data can be used to
evaluate potential changes on marketing activities and livelihoods. Due to space limitations, this analysis is not pursued in this study.
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cereals and legumes significantly declined when 2004/05 is compared to the situation in 1995. This
may be attributed to drought that prevailed in 2004, which drastically reduced market participation
(Table 3). In contrast, a high proportion of households now use fertilizer and manure compared to 10
years earlier. The proportion of households in Mbeere using fertilizer rose from 1 to 5% over the past
10 years. In Makueni this proportion increased from 0 to 3% over the same period. Drought risk is a
major factor limiting fertilizer use on rainfed crops. It reduces total production and hence marketed
surplus of food crops grown in these areas. A comparison between cereal and legume surplus
producing households reveals a relatively higher percentage of households producing surplus cereals
than legumes. This could be attributed to most legumes being susceptible to drought compared to
cereals and also to a proportionately larger land area devoted to cereals than legumes.
Table 2. Socioeconomic profile of the PMGs.
Distance to
Nearest grain district
Female Initial wholesaler commercial Distance to
PMG Group size members (%) capital (KSH#) market (km) centre (km) Nairobi (km)
Mbeere district
Wango 116 62 8170 14 100 101
Nthingini 123 75 2620 11 150 280
Kilia 184 61 2800 20 80 118
Kamwiyendeyi 112 67 2640 4 120 93
Makima 50 40 17700 0 42 160
Makueni district
Emali 164 46 16000 9 50 118
Thavu 120 17 4062 7 30 160
Kathonzweni 68 75 600 0 25 168
Kalamba 47 93 600 15 26 134
KYM* 65 49 1480 11 11 150
Average 105 58 5667 9 63 148
* Kampi Ya Mawe
# Kenyan Shilling
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 3. Household market participation, marketed surplus and resource management
conditions (%) in PMG villages.
Mbeere Makueni Total
10 years before 2005 10 years before 2005  10 years before 2005
Issue (1,989) (2,827) (478) (1,153) (2,467) (3,980)
Produce surplus for markets (cereals) 44 19 29 10 26 14
Produce surplus for markets (legumes) 44 16 22 7 33 11
Using farmyard manure 30 67 38 65 33 66
Using mineral fertilizer 1 5 0 3 1 4
Using field pesticides 22 75 25 46 24 61
Using storage pesticides 21 70 41 73 31 72
The values in parentheses are the household populations from which the proportions have been derived.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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The level of poverty in the PMG villages is very high. A significant proportion (60-70%) of households is
below the poverty line4 and relies primarily on subsistence agriculture. Landlessness is relatively low (1-
11%) but land productivity is limited by biophysical factors and low level of technology adoption (Table
4). The higher level of landlessness (11%) in Mbeere district is attributable to high population density
and some immigration from neighboring districts like Embu and Kirinyaga who are attracted by the
farming opportunities on government owned land schemes. About 54% and 43% of the households
owned oxen and sheep in 1995 respectively. However, in 2005 these proportions declined to 45% and
23%. This could be a reflection of increasing scarcity of grazing lands due to population growth and also
due to some level of distress-selling of livestock due to recurrent droughts. The decline in ownership of
oxen and the proportion of households who lack these assets (55%) is particularly damaging as land is
primarily cultivated using oxen-drawn ploughs. Goats were owned by about 78% of households in both
periods which shows that they are a popular form of investment in the semi-arid areas.
Table 4. Poverty profiles and technology adoption in PMG villages.
Mbeere district Makueni district Total
10 years before 2005 10 years before 2005 10 years before 2005
Issue (1,989) (2,827) (478) (1,153) (2,467) (3,980)
Average number of households per village 199 283 68 115 134 199
Landless households (%) 12 11 0 1 6 6
Households owning local cows (%) 69 57 53 59 61 58
Households owning improved cows (%) 0 9 3 3 2 7
Households owning oxen (%) 62 49 47 42 54 45
Households owning sheep (%) 44 24 42 22 43 23
Households owning goats (%) 78 74 79 83 79 78
The values in parentheses are the household populations from which the proportions have been derived.
Source: PMG survey 2005
4.2. Aspirations of PMGs
The stated objectives of the PMGs ranged from better prices for their produce, access to inputs,
development of business skills, knowledge sharing and transformation to business entities where
membership can acquire shares. Obtaining better prices for local produce was the most frequently
stated objective pursued by all PMGs followed by development of business skills (50%), access to
better inputs (40%), increased commercialization of production (30%), transformation to business
entities (10%) and sharing knowledge and information (10%) (Table 5). Low and variable grain prices
and high transaction costs for local produce seem to drive the interest to work as a group.
Grain prices fluctuate significantly according to local supply and demand conditions in local markets.
For example, pigeonpea prices were lowest during harvesting (July – September) and highest during
planting period (October – December) (Figure 2). The average price variation was about Ksh 13.00/
kg. Accordingly maize prices were quite low (January – March) coinciding with the harvest of the
short rains season crop followed by the harvest of the main rains season crop (July – September), but
higher during the intervening periods when local supply is limited (Figure 3). The mean maize price
4 The key informants in each village were asked to state a monthly income that would define the local poverty line based on average family
sizes in the areas. The mean estimated poverty line was Ksh 5075 per month. This translates to about Ksh 31 per person per day, which
is equivalent to USD 0.44 ($1 = Ksh 70). This is lower than the rural poverty line per capita income of Ksh 41 ($0.6) defined by the
government of Kenya (Republic of Kenya 2000).
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variability was Ksh 11.30. Although these price fluctuations can be explained by the supply and
demand conditions, the results also reflect the vulnerability of farmers in marginal areas to price
variations which is aggravated by the recurrent droughts.
Half the PMGs aspire to access training in business and entrepreneurial skills for agribusiness and
enterprise development. This is consistent with the need to manage the PMG business enterprises to
enhance economic efficiency and competitiveness. The stated objective of access to commercial inputs
and commercialization of agriculture are correlated and show that smallholders are keen to benefit from
market opportunities. Some of the PMGs plan to establish a business enterprise with share capital, a
long term goal that they may move towards as collective action becomes more effective.
When asked whether they had achieved their stated objectives, a majority of the PMGs reported that
they had partly achieved them while those that had not achieved any, were working towards those
goals despite several constraints. The reasons for non-achievement of the objectives included lack of
credit, lack of ready markets, drought, poor PMG leadership and conduct of members, lack of
capacity to identify and collect information and price fluctuations in that order of descending
Table 5. PMG objectives and aspirations.
Stated objective % cases (n = 10)
Obtain better prices 100
Access training and other assistance 50
Access improved seed and other inputs 40
Increased commercialization of production 30
Establish business entities with share capital 10
Share knowledge and information 10
n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Figure 2. Seasonal price fluctuations for dry pigeonpea (Ksh/kg).
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importance. The groups were further asked whether they intended to expand group functions into
new directions. Several of them indicated their willingness to broaden operations by expanding into
other related activities. In order of importance (measured by median rankings), the PMGs aspire to
participate in the marketing of agricultural inputs (1.5), marketing of alternative high value crops (eg,
vegetables and groundnuts) (2.5), watershed management (3.5) and value addition (4.5) (Table 6).
Although there is variation in the rankings on some of the activities across districts, the results suggest
that the PMGs intend to diversify more into linked activities where they have gained experience and
skills, with limited interest to establish backward linkages along the pre-production to marketing and
consumption value chain (eg, collective watershed management).
Table 6. Ranking of PMG interests and priorities to expand group activities (where 1 =
most important).
Activity Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Agricultural input marketing 3.0 (2) 1.8 (1) 2.4 (1.5)
Marketing new high value crops 3.4 (4) 21.6 (2) 12.5 (2.5)
Watershed management 3.4 (4) 2.8 (3) 3.1 (3.5)
Value addition or processing 6.8 (8) 3.0 (3) 4.9 (4.5)
Recruiting more members 4.6 (3) 6 (6) 5.3 (5)
Live animals 5.8 (6) 24.8 (7) 15.3 (6)
Marketing livestock products 24.4 (7) 24 (6) 24.2 (6)
Figures in parenthesis are medians; n = the number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Figure 3. Seasonal price fluctuations for maize (Ksh/kg).
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4.3. Governance of PMGs
An important aspect of governance of PMGs is their constitution (by-laws) that define the norms of
operations, the roles and responsibilities of various organs and members versus the management that
oversees the running of the PMGs on behalf of members. All the PMGs had written by-laws governing
the running of their groups. The by-laws stressed more on the obligations of the members to the group
but were relatively silent on the obligations of the group to members. For example, the by-laws
require that members sell their grain through the PMG, make requisite payments and/or
contributions, prioritize farming of marketable crops (eg, pigeonpea) and contribute actively to the
development of the group. Successful governance can be inferred from the level of adherence to the
by-laws. On average 77% of active members abided by established by-laws. Violations of by-laws was
associated with a number of reasons including ignorance about the by-laws, cash constraints to honor
their payment obligations, lack of trust in the PMG leadership, and lack of commitment to the PMG
cause (Table 7). It was stated that those members who violated the by-laws were either fined or
expelled, especially if they were repeat offenders.
The PMGs had executive committees that were elected through a non-secret vote counting process
and given the responsibility of running the affairs of the PMGs on behalf of the members.5 The
membership of these committees included the chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, vice secretary,
treasurer, vice treasurer, marketing representative and a varying number of ordinary members. The
mean annual executive meetings were 15 with a median of 12 (Table 8). The groups had convened five
(in Mbeere) to six (in Makueni) general assembly meetings since their formation. The proportion of
members attending the general assembly meetings ranged from 42% in Makueni to 63% in Mbeere.
5 It is possible that non-secret ballots could be vulnerable to manipulation and rent-seeking behavior that may reduce the performance of
farmer organizations (eg, Mude 2006). While most PMG leaders were elected through an open vote counting process, some of them
adopted a consensus approach through acclamation. There is a need to institute proper democratic procedures that determine the
period of service and allow unhindered expression of choice of leaders by the members.
Table 7. Reasons PMG members state for not following by-laws.
Reason % of cases
Lack of awareness of by-laws 63
Lack of trust in group leadership and vision 63
Too busy with other commitments 38
Cash constraints (to pay PMG fees) 38
Lack of commitment to PMG goods 13
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 8. PMG meetings and attendance levels in two districts.
Meeting type Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Executive meetings since establishment 16 (12) 14 (12) 15 (12)
Executive meetings attendance (%) 72 65 69
General assembly meetings since establishment 7 (5) 9 (6) 8 (6)
General assembly meetings in 2004 3 (3) 5 (3) 4 (3)
General assembly meetings attendance in 2004 (%) 63 42 52
Figures in parenthesis are medians; n = the number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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Regarding governance and management qualities of the PMG leadership, the respondents ranked
several attributes of the office bearers or management systems in order of importance. These included
quality of the chairperson (median = 2) followed by the quality of the executive committee (median
= 2.5) while transparency in accounting, rules and norms for coordination, and rules and norms for
conflict resolution, with a median of 3, were equally ranked (Table 9).
4.4. PMGs, markets and marketing channels
The PMGs are expected to play a primary role in facilitating the integration of small producers into well
functioning markets. Using data from the household survey, we analyzed the market structure in terms of
transactions (number of sales and volume) by distance and market participants during 2003/2004 trade
year. The results show that rural wholesalers accounted for 45% of transactions and 49% of the volume
traded while brokers/assemblers accounted for 38% of the transactions and of the traded volume (Table
10). PMGs accounted for 4% of the sales and 2% of the volume and rural consumers (ie, farmers who are
deficit producers) accounted for less than 10% of the sales and volume purchased from farmers. The low
market share of the PMGs in the marketing chain can be attributed to their inability to pay immediately
after grain delivery making them less attractive to cash-constrained farmers. Schools also bought grain for
the “school feeding program” that accounted for 3% of the transactions and 2% of the volume traded. The
results further indicate that 45% of the traded volume and 36% of the transactions were conducted at the
farmgate. It is also evident that rural wholesalers and broker/assemblers jointly control more than 80% of
the transactions and traded volumes. This shows that these marketing channels are the easily available
options to farmers in remote areas. The rural brokers/assemblers are well organized buyers with the
necessary capital and mobility to buy directly from dispersed farmers. The rural wholesalers do not buy as
much as brokers/assemblers at the farmgate mainly because they are less mobile and often require farmers
to bring their produce to their trading points.
About 34% of the transactions, which accounted for 25% of the traded volume, were conducted
within 3 km off farmgate. Although the transactions at the two points were not very different, the
differential in traded volume is large, showing that at large distances, small volumes are transacted.
This evidence attests to the fact that large distances can lead to incomplete markets as farmers
attempt to economize on transportation costs, especially when prices do not increase significantly
with distance to compensate for the added costs (Key et al. 2000). It is important to note that with
increasing distance from the farmgate, the number of transactions and volumes traded by market
participant decline. This can be attributed to the increasing transportation and transaction costs for
the small quantities marketed and is consistent with the findings by Fafchamps and Hill (2005), which
Table 9. Mean and median ranking of factors important for PMG governance and
management (where 1 = excellent).
Attribute Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Quality of the chairperson 2.6 (2) 2.2 (2) 2.4 (2)
Transparency in accounting 2.6 (3) 2.2 (2) 2.4 (2.5)
Quality of the executive committee 3 (3) 2.8 (3) 2.9 (3)
Rules and norms for coordination 2.8 (3) 3 (3) 2.9 (3)
Rules and norms for conflict resolution 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3)
n = the number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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show that selling directly to markets (where farmers can get a higher price but must incur a transport
cost) is more likely when the quantity sold is large and the market is close by. This further indicates a
potential business opportunity for PMGs through bulk selling.
To illustrate the market transactions by different market participants in terms of prices, market shares,
and also the effect of drought, we present the case of pigeonpea for 2003 and 2005 (Table 11). The
results show that the drought situation that prevailed in 2004 had significantly depressed the marketed
surplus and the number of transactions6. While the number of transactions declined from 243 in 2003 to
just 50 in 2005, traded volume declined from about 41 tons to 4.7 tons. This drastic change in market
participation is significant given that pigeonpea is one of the most drought-tolerant crops grown in these
areas. When we look at the prices offered by the different buyers, the PMG prices (Ksh 27/kg) were
higher than all other agents. The prices paid by the other agents seem to be relatively similar (Ksh 23-25/
kg). Does this indicate that the PMGs (after having covered their marketing and administration costs)
indeed pay a statistically higher price with lower variance than the other buyers?
Statistical and econometric methods were used to test these effects. An F-test using analyses of
variance methods confirmed that the mean prices offered by different buyers varied significantly
across buyers of maize, beans, and greengram whereas a Bartlett test for equal variance (Ho: unit price
variances across buyers are equal) was rejected (at 5% level) for most crops other than cotton (see
Appendix 2). The group variance comparison test was used to check whether the PMGs helped to
reduce price instability or variability. This was done only for pigeonpea and greengram, the two crops
that the PMGs bought in 2005. The null hypotheses of equal variance in the pigeonpea prices of
PMGs and other buyers (rural assemblers/brokers & rural wholesalers) were not rejected at 5% level.
For greengram, the results show that the PMG prices seemed to have higher variability compared to
prices paid by rural wholesalers. However, the null hypothesis of equal variance was not rejected
when PMG greengram price was compared to that of rural assemblers/brokers. This suggests that
while PMGs may offer higher mean prices to member farmers, the effect on price stabilization is
unlikely to be evident in the cross-sectional data used here.
In order to test whether the average prices paid by the PMGs were statistically different after controlling
for other factors, we estimated an econometric model for actual prices received by farmers. The model
dependent variable was the unit price received by farmers for different crops in different markets
located at varying distances from the farm (including the farmgate). The model explanatory variables
included: amount sold, amount sold squared, distance to the point of sell, dummy variables for the type
of crop sold (bean, pigeonpea, greengram, cowpea, cotton and vegetables), the quality of grain sold, the
type of buyer (PMG, consumer, rural wholesaler, urban trader, ginnery, school), season the grain was
sold, gender of household head, level of education of the household head, access to information and
fixed district level effects. A detailed description of these variables is given in Table 12.
The estimated model was significant (P < 0.001) and explained about 61% of the variation
(R2 = 0.612). The model results show that farmer grain prices are significantly determined by the
distance to the point of transaction, the type of crop sold, location by district, buyer type (particularly
consumers, PMGs and schools) and the season the grain is sold. Unit prices were positively correlated
with distance (Table 13). Specifically, prices seem to increase by about Ksh 0.2 for every 10 km
traveled from the farmgate (P < 0.1). The effect of distance is interesting: while prices seem to
increase as distance increases, the price change for the range of distances covered in this study (less
6 Meteorological data show that the average annual rainfall for Makueni (2004) was about 468 mm, which is well below the minimum
rainfall of about 650 mm required for agricultural production in these areas. While farmers also reported drought conditions in Mbeere
in 2004, the severity seems to be lower than in Makueni.
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than 10 km) does not seem to be significant enough to create incentives for small producers to travel
long distances for grain marketing. The small price gain is likely to be muted by the associated
transportation costs unless the quantity sold is large enough to exploit economies of scale. This seems
to explain why most farmers prefer to sell the grain at the farmgate (Tables 10 and 11). After
controlling for the crop type, season, quality and type of buyer, amount sold does not seem to have a
significant effect on prices received by farmers. While price and volume sold seem to be negatively
correlated the relationship is not significant. This indicates that smallholders are price takers and
volumes from individual farmers are too small to influence market prices.
The prices vary significantly across crops (P < 0.01). In relation to maize (reference crop) the price
variation ranges from Ksh 4/kg for cowpea (Cowpea) to about Ksh 15/kg for beans (Beans). Pigeonpea
and greengram – two predominant cash crops in the study districts – sell at Ksh 12 over and above the
price for maize while chickpea fetches about Ksh 14/kg more than maize. An interesting result is that
grain quality does not seem to matter in price determination (the price differential between above
average quality and average quality grain is insignificant). This is a reflection of the classic case of
Table 12. Description of regression model variables (n = 624*).
Variable name Description Mean Minimum Maximum
Price (dependent) Unit price (Ksh/kg) 19.24 6 50
Sold Amount sold (kg) 324.95 3 6000
Sold squared Amount sold squared (1000 kg) 439 0.009 36,000
Distance Distance to sales point (km) 4.6 0 400
Maize (reference) Maize (1 = maize, 0 = otherwise) 0.46 0 1
Beans Beans (1 = beans, 0 = otherwise) 0.06 0 1
Pigeonpea Pigeonpea grain (1 = pigeonpea grain, 0 = otherwise) 0.08 0 1
Chickpea Chickpea (1 = chickpea, 0 = otherwise) 0.03 0 1
Greengram Greengram (1 = greengram, 0 = otherwise) 0.27 0 1
Cowpea Cowpea (1 = cowpea, 0 = otherwise) 0.03 0 1
Cotton Cotton (1  = cotton, 0 = otherwise) 0.04 0 1
Vegetables Vegetables (1 = vegetables, 0 = otherwise) 0.04 0 1
Quality1 (reference) Quality of the crop sold (1 = above average, 0  = average) 0.08 0 1
Quality2 Quality of the crop sold (1 = average, 0 = above average) 0.92 0 1
District District (1 = Makueni, 0 = Mbeere) 0.16 0 1
District (reference) District (1 = Mbeere, 0 = Makueni) 0.84 0 1
Broker (reference) Broker/assembler buyer (1 = broker/assembler, 0 = otherwise) 0.38 0 1
Consumer Consumer buyer (1 = consumer, 0 = otherwise) 0.05 0 1
PMG PMG buyer (1 = PMG, 0 = otherwise) 0.04 0 1
Rural wholesaler Rural wholesaler buyer (1 = Rural wholesaler, 0 = otherwise) 0.45 0 1
Urban trader Urban trader buyer (1 = urban trader, 0 = otherwise) 0.02 0 1
Cotton ginnery Cotton ginnery buyer (1 = cotton ginnery, 0 = otherwise) 0.02 0 1
School School buyer (1 = schools, 0 = otherwise) 0.03 0 1
Season1 Harvest season (1 = harvest, 0 = otherwise) 0.71 0 1
Season2 Some 2-3 months after harvest (Yes = 1, 0 = 0therwise) 0.19 0 1
Season3 (reference) Some 4-5 months after harvest (Yes = 1, 0 = otherwise) 0.11 0 1
Gender Gender of household head (1 = Male, 0 = Female) 0.84 0 1
Education Education of household head (Years) 6.79 0 14
Own ICT Household owns ICT# (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.82 0 1
*n  = 624 is the number of point transactions;
# ICT means Information and Communication Technology assets (eg, radio, television and mobile phone).
Source: Household survey 2005
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asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970) where buyers take the quality of a good to be uncertain and
consider only average quality of a good with the implication that suppliers of superior produce will be
driven out of the market.
Indicating some differences in price across districts, farmers in Makueni district receive Ksh 2/kg less
than those in the (reference) Mbeere district (P < 0.01). This may be due to the relative proximity of
Mbeere district to Nairobi – a major urban market for agricultural produce across the country
(Table 2). When we look at the different marketing channels, consumers, PMGs and schools
respectively paid about Ksh 7, Ksh 6, and about Ksh 4 over and above the prices paid by brokers/
assemblers (P < 0.01). The buying prices of rural wholesalers, urban traders and cotton ginneries are
not significantly different from those paid by the brokers. This shows that PMGs can be attractive
market outlets for small producers especially if they can resolve certain marketing constraints. The
school feeding programs (captured by the school variable) also seem to provide an alternative market
outlet for farmers at prices significantly higher than brokers (P < 0.01).
Controlling for crop type, market outlet distances, location, and the type of grain buyer, farmers
selling their produce at harvest (Season1) would lose about Ksh 1.5/kg compared to those who can
Table 13. Determinants of grain prices received by farmers (STATA results).
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P>|t|
Sold -0.001 0.001 -0.97 0.334
Sold squared 3.34x10-8 2.13x10-7 0.16 0.875
Distance 0.023 0.012 1.97 0.050
Beans 15.163 1.011 14.99 0.000
Pigeonpea 11.275 0.935 12.06 0.000
Chickpea 13.512 1.452 9.31 0.000
Greengram 12.321 0.634 19.45 0.000
Cowpea 4.061 1.359 2.99 0.003
Cotton 7.760 1.625 4.77 0.000
Vegetables 7.421 1.347 5.51 0.000
Quality 0.222 0.865 0.26 0.797
District -2.194 0.739 -2.97 0.003
Consumer 6.757 1.123 6.02 0.000
PMG 5.950 1.180 5.04 0.000
Rural wholesaler -0.614 0.513 -1.20 0.232
Urban trader 0.988 1.884 0.52 0.600
Cotton ginnery 1.017 2.093 0.49 0.627
School 3.570 1.341 2.66 0.008
Season1 -1.491 0.762 -1.96 0.051
Season2 -1.173 0.884 -1.33 0.185
Gender 0.553 0.680 0.81 0.417
Education -0.032 0.066 -0.49 0.622
Own ICT 0.056 0.650 0.09 0.932
Constant 13.914 1.421 9.79 0.000
N 624
F(23,600) 41.09
R2 0.612
Reference variables include: crop price = maize; quality = above average; District = Mbeere district; buyer = broker/assembler;
season = 4-5 months after harvest.
Source: Household survey 2005
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afford to delay selling for 4-5 months (reference season) after harvest (P < 0.1). However, the price
differential for a 2-3 months delay after harvest (Season2) is not significantly different from a 4-5
months delay. This implies that storing grain would be beneficial to the farmers especially if the
incremental price would offset the storage costs including potential weight loss and pest attack. This
shows that PMGs can exploit the seasonal price variability by facilitating storage and bulk sales (to
reduce unit storage costs) so that farmers can benefit from better prices later in the season.
4.5. PMGs and price determination
Various factors may affect the buying and selling prices of a product differently depending on how the buyer
or seller ranks the factors on a given scale. With respect to PMGs, the prices they offer will determine their
attractiveness to members as a market outlet for their produce. Using group data, the mean and median
rankings of factors considered in setting buying and selling prices of the PMGs were analyzed.
The results show that prices offered by other traders (rank 2), season (rank 3), prevailing prices in
Nairobi and other urban centers (3.5), and product quality (rank 4) are the most important factors
that the PMGs take into account in determining grain buying prices (Table 14). However, prices in
Nairobi and other urban areas (rank 1), prices offered by other traders (rank 2), product quality (rank
3) and season (rank 4) are important in determining the selling prices of PMGs. The importance of
urban centers in determining PMGs prices suggests some degree of grain market co-integration
between the rural and urban markets. Furthermore, the end users of the products in the marketing
chain are generally located in the urban areas. Farmer production costs are not highly ranked in
determining PMG buying or selling prices. This means that PMGs are grain price takers rather than
price setters. Interestingly, the ranks seem to indicate that quality is more important during selling
rather than buying the products. The econometric analysis results presented in Table 13 have
confirmed that quality did not affect prices received by farmers.
Although there is no price premium for quality, PMGs consider certain grain quality attributes when
buying from members. These attributes include pest attack, moisture content, foreign matter, grain
color, among others. These factors reflect the quality of the produce that is desired by the PMGs. The
median rankings show that pest attack (1), percentage of foreign matter in the grain (2.5), moisture
Table 14. Rankings of determinants of buying and selling prices (where 1 = most
important).
Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Factor Buying selling Buying Selling Buying Selling
Price in Nairobi and/or other 5.6 (5) 2 (1) 2 (1) 1.4 (1) 3.8 (3.5) 1.7 (1)
urban areas
Price offered by traders 4 (2) 2.6 (2) 2 (2) 2.8 (2) 1.8 (2) 3 (2)
Product quality 4.8 (4) 3.6 (3) 4.2 (4) 3.4 (3) 4.5 (4) 3.5 (3)
Season 6.6 (5) 5.2 (5) 2.2 (3) 2.8 (3) 4.1 (3) 4 (4)
Prices asked by farmers 6 (6) 4 (4) 5.4 (5) 4.8 (5) 5.7 (5.5) 4.4 (5)
Previous year price 7 (6) 6 (6.5) 5.2 (6) 5.8 (6) 5.7 (6) 5.7 (6)
Production cost 5.4 (6) 4.8 (5) 8 (8) 8 (8) 6.7 (8) 6.4 (8)
Transport cost 8 (8) 7.8 (8) 8 (8) 8 (8) 8 (8) 7.9 (8)
Figures in parentheses are medians; n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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content (3.5), grain size (3.5), and grain color (4.5) are important attributes (Table 15). This is likely to
affect the supply of quality and differentiated products by small farmers as they lack the incentives in a
market where prices reflect fair average quality and there is no premium for superior quality products.
When PMGs coordinate marketing functions, they need to cover the associated administration and other
transaction costs. Assembling, bulking, storage and marketing functions and the associated costs need to be
explicitly considered in determining the final price paid to farmers. For example, depending on the duration
of storage, the grain could lose weight through moisture loss, and hence the total quantity sold. The results
show that farmers who sold through the PMGs received, on average, between 90-95% of the PMG selling
price (Table 16). The balance was used by the PMGs to cover costs incurred in coordinating sales including
transportation costs. This indicates a high level of efficiency by the PMGs in their marketing functions.
Another critical factor that determines the choice of marketing channels by farmers is the time lag
between delivery and receipt of payments for the delivered product. The delay in payments among
different buyers after grain delivery varied between instantaneous and five weeks (Table 17). Brokers/
assemblers and schools paid on delivery, while rural wholesalers, urban traders and the cotton ginnery
paid about a day after delivery. In contrast, it took the PMGs five weeks to pay farmers after they had
delivered their grain. Many cash-constrained farmers who need cash to settle various commitments
(eg, loans, schools fees and other necessities) at the time of delivery often opt to sell their grain
through other channels even if this means relatively lower prices. One useful strategy for the PMGs to
increase their market share would require that they pay farmers at least a certain proportion of the
grain value at the time of delivery pending full payments after selling the grain at a higher price later.
Table 16. Average PMG selling price and farmers’ final price (2003 and 2004).
Crop PMG selling price (Ksh/kg) Farmers’ final price (Ksh/kg) Farmer price (% of PMG price)
Maize 18 16 89
Dry pigeonpea grain 22 21 93
Green pigeonpea 14 13 90
Beans 40 20 50
Greengram 25 24 94
Kabuli chickpea 40 38 95
Desi chickpea 20 18 90
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 15. Mean and median rankings of pigeonpea quality attributes (where 1 = most
important).
Attribute Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Pest attack 2.4 (2) 1.8 (1) 1.8 (1)
Foreign matter 3.4 (4) 2.2 (2) 2.8 (2.5)
Moisture content 3.8 (4) 3.4 (3) 3.6 (3.5)
Grain size 3.6 (5) 3.4 (4) 3.5 (4)
Grain color 3.6 (3) 4.8 (5) 4.2 (4.5)
Smell 6.6 (6) 6 (6) 6.3 (6)
Field pests 5 (7) 7 (7) 6 (7)
Mixed varieties 6.6 (7) 7 (7) 6.8 (7)
Values in parentheses are medians; n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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4.6. Collective action and PMG performance
One major difficulty in collective action studies is to measure the level of collective action and how
such group action contributes to final performance outcomes. Generally there are no standardized
measures or indicators that can be used to assess the level, viability and effectiveness (performance) of
collective action (eg, Place et al. 2002). However, depending on the problem under investigation,
certain indicators may be identified as proxies for the differential level of collective action (those that
capture the level of cooperation or group action) and the degree of effectiveness of such collective
action in attaining a group’s stated objectives. This kind of separation allows us to assess the extent to
which collective action can be attributed to good performance in terms of final outcomes. Accordingly
we use a qualitative approach based on an in-depth study of the PMG operations to identify some
indicators for the levels of collective action and its effectiveness (performance).
The level of collective action across groups can be inferred by commitment attributes of the individual
members to the group activities and objectives. These may include the extent to which individual
members relate with other members of the group within the confines of the existing institutional
mechanisms and governance structures, and commitment or subscription to the group’s ideals or the
extent to which the individual members share a common vision. Accordingly, six indicators of
collective action were identified: the number of elections since formation, share of members
respecting the bylaws, attendance of meetings, annual member contributions to the group, cash
capital and agreed annual subscription fees. In order to facilitate comparison across groups, the
indicators were standardized in per capita or in percentage values.
The results using these indicators show that the level of collective action varied across PMGs
(Table 18). Elections are a means through which members can ensure that groups are managed
effectively. They are an indication that members are actively participating in group decisions which are
monitored and enforced collectively (McCarthy et al. 2002), which is a good measure of the level of
collective action. The groups conducted an election annually although in two groups (Nthingini and
Kamwiyendeyi), elections were conducted after two years, whereas Makima conducted elections
biannually (indicating a higher level of collective action).
By-laws define the obligation and the mode of interaction between members and the PMG leadership
for the smooth and effective running of the groups in the process of pursuing the groups’ objectives.
Abiding by the laws also reduces governance and coordination costs. The proportion of members who
respect group by-laws ranged between 50 and 100%. Half the PMGs reported that upwards of 75% of
Table 17. Number of weeks taken for payment after sale by market participants.
Buyer Mean Number of transactions
Broker/assemblers 0.0 237
School 0.0 19
Rural wholesaler 0.1 283
Consumer 0.1 33
Urban trader 0.1 13
Cotton ginnery 1.2 12
PMG 5.0 27
Total 0.3 624
Source: Household survey 2005
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the members adhered to the by-laws. PMGs like Makima, Emali and Thavu had higher values on this
indicator. A related indicator is the proportion of members attending general assembly meetings
where important resolutions are passed. It shows the level of involvement by individuals in the
management and coordination of collective action. The proportion of members who attended the
general assembly meetings was 46-95%, with 60% of the PMGs reporting less than 65% attendance.
The good performers in this indicator include Thavu, Kamyendeyi and Kathonzweni.
Annual subscriptions can be used by PMGs to overcome working capital constraints in the course of
their operations. Member contributions are usually aimed at pooling resources for implementing a group
project where members have a common interest. Hence, the amount of annual subscriptions is a good
indicator that shows commitment on the part of the members towards the PMG objectives. Accordingly
annual subscriptions varied across the groups and were between Ksh 0-1800. High annual subscriptions
are likely to lead to higher capital investments by PMGs over time7. The per capita contributions in 2004
ranged between Ksh 0 and 264. The per capita operating capital held in 2005 ranged between Ksh 0-
319. Groups like Makima, Kathonzweni and Kalamba performed best on these indicators.
Based on the selected six indicators for the level of collective action, the PMGs were ranked (1 = most
successful) according to the values of each indicator to identify those that are relatively more successful in
collective action, and also to identify the factors that contribute to good performance. A simple average
rank was then computed across the six indicators. Since we have assumed equal weights for these
indicators for simplicity, the PMGs below the average rank of 5 may be considered relatively more
successful in collective action. The mean rankings show that Kalamba (3.0), Makima (3.2), Kathonzweni
(4.3) and Wango (4.8) were more successful than the rest (Table 19). Kilia with a ranking of 6.8 was the
least successful in terms of the level of collective action. This shows that despite its simplicity, the average
ranks indeed selected the PMGs that did well in more than two or three of the collective action indicators.
To get insights on whether high levels of collective action lead to high level of performance in collective
outcomes, the PMGs were compared on the basis of two outcome indicators: total assets built over time
and total volume of grains traded (both standardized per member). The distribution of the levels of
these indicators across PMGs show that per capita assets were lowest in Nthingini (Ksh 34) and highest
in Kathonzweni (about Ksh 6393) while the per capita total sales for the 2003/04 ranged between a low
of 3 kg in Thavu and 242 kg in Kathonzweni (Table 20). When the sales are disaggregated by year, it
becomes evident that some PMGs did not trade in one year or another while some traded in both years.
As consistency in grain marketing is a good indicator of performance, the volume of trade is separately
ranked for the two years. The aggregate rankings across the three indicators (ie, combining assets built
over time and crop sales per capita) show that Kathonzweni (1.3), Kalamba (3.3) and Makima (3.5) have
performed much better than PMGs like Emali, Thavu, KYM (6.7) and Nthingini (7.5) (Table 21).
Qualitative discussions and frequent observations during the field survey also identified these three
PMGs as the best performers both in terms of the level of collective action and the marketing functions.
Assuming that performance is a function of the level of collective action and other factors (eg,
distance to markets), a simple graphical analysis of the drivers of performance (both positive and
negative) was undertaken. The results show that the number of elections held, initial start-up capital
and membership fees are important positive correlates with PMG performance (Figure 4). Corollary
to the effects of positive drivers, the number of villages covered by the PMG, distance to markets
(grain wholesalers and district commercial centers), and group size seem to be negatively associated
7 High subscription or membership fees may also lead to exclusion of the poor with potentially negative distributive impacts for marginal
and vulnerable groups.
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with the effectiveness of marketing functions of the PMGs (Figure 5). The number of villages covered
by a PMG is highest for Emali, but relatively smaller for Makima, Kathonzweni and Kalamba, the
more successful PMGs. The distance to wholesalers is shortest for Makima and Kathonzweni, located
close to rural market centers, but higher for Nthingini, Kalamba, Kilia and KYM. The poorly-
performing PMGs, Nthingini, Kamwiyendei and Wango, are also located far from the district
commercial center. Moreover, the better performing PMGs like Makima, Kathonzweni, and Kalamba
had relatively smaller group sizes compared to poor performers, Kilia, Nthingini and Emali.
Consistent with the findings reported by McCarthy et al. (2002), group performance seemed to
decline with increase in distance to markets. These results indicate that proximity to markets is likely
to improve marketing functions and competitive behavior through better access to market
information that would help PMGs make informed decisions on buying and selling prices, and better
advertise their stock to wholesalers or other agents. It also shows that shorter distance to service
centers and buyers at the end of the marketing chain is likely to enhance the degree of
complementarity between PMGs and private enterprises.
Table 20. Selected indicators of performance of Collective Action.
Per capita sales volume Per capita total sales
Per capita assets built (kg/member) volume (kg/member)
PMG over time (Ksh/member) 2003* 2004 2003-04
Wango 63 - 8 8
Nthingini 34 - 7 7
Kilia 177 34 23 57
Kamwiyendeyi 333 192 0 192
Makima 301 - 123 123
Emali 268 92 0 92
Thavu 395 3 0 3
Kathonzweni 6393 212 30 242
Kalamba 3130 46 8 54
KYM 335 10 0 10
* Missing data indicates that PMGs were established later in 2003 and did not sell during that year.
Source: PMG survey 2005
Table 21. Rankings of PMGs based on performance indicators (where 1 = most
successful).
Per capita asset Per capita sales Per capita sales Mean
PMG built over time (2003) (2004) Per capita crop sales Aggregate
Kathonzweni 1 1 2 1.5 1.3
Kalamba 2 4 4 4.0 3.3
Makima 6 -* 1 1.0 3.5
Kilia 8 5 3 4.0 5.3
Kamwiyendeyi 4 2 10 6.0 5.3
Wango 9 - 4 4.0 6.5
Emali 7 3 10 6.5 6.7
Thavu 3 7 10 8.5 6.7
KYM 4 6 10 8.0 6.7
Nthingini 10 - 5 5.0 7.5
* Missing data indicates that PMGs were established later in 2003 and did not sell during that year.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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Figure 5. Negative correlates with PMG performance.
Figure 4. Some drivers of PMG performance.
Although group size has been shown to be positively correlated to performance (Place et al. 2002), the
qualitative evidence provided here shows that this may not necessarily be the case. Effective group
size is likely to vary by the type of collective action. In addition, group size may have a non-linear
relationship with performance which would suggests that medium sized groups are more likely to
succeed than very small groups or very large groups (Agrawal and Goyal 2001), depending on
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transaction, organizational and managerial costs of cooperation (Hussi et al. 1993). An optimal group
size will be one that minimizes these costs, and improves the coordination of production and
marketing functions. The challenge for the PMGs would be how to determine the effective group size
that would be big enough to exploit economies of scale, without leading to coordination failure and
prevalence of conflicts. Generally, the negative correlates jointly constrain coordination of production
and the marketing functions of the PMGs. Long distance implies geographical isolation, while group
size and the number of villages covered by a single PMG could be associated with higher transaction
costs, coordination failure and lack of cohesion or shared goals and values.
4.7. Constraints to collective marketing
For the PMGs to be effective and successful in their collective marketing functions, constraints to
their operations will have to be addressed. The median rank for the three most important constraints
to collective marketing was given as: lack of credit (1), price variability (3) and low volumes (3)
(Table 22). In addition, lack of buyers (4) and low business skills (6) appear to be relatively important.
The prominence of lack of credit as a major constraint to collective marketing is consistent with the
wide recognition that this service can play an important role for marketing and enterprise
development (eg, Bingen et al. 1993; Kirkpatrick and Maimbo 2002) and for remedying market
imperfections associated with risk and imperfect information (eg, Poulton et al. 1998; Kelly et al.
2003). Nonetheless, there are three approaches through which constrained access to credit by PMGs
can be addressed, namely: rural micro-credit facilities, contract or outgrower schemes, and inventory
credit (see Kindness and Gordon 2001).
Micro-credit schemes are a response to market failure in conventional banking services for the rural
poor. They are associated with group lending since individual farmers rarely have bankable assets that
can be used as collateral against formal loans. In addition, individual market transactions are largely
informal such that formal banks are unable to collect information on prices independently. But peer
pressure can effectively substitute for collateral, as group members are likely to take action to prevent
a fellow member from defaulting. With a lead model demonstrated by the Grameen bank in
Bangladesh, there are now several successful examples across Africa (eg, K-Rep Bank in Kenya). The
disadvantage of such schemes is that their operations are normally subsidized such that the
Table 22. Rankings of PMG collective marketing constraints (where 1 = most important).
Constraint Mbeere (n = 5) Makueni (n = 5) Total (n = 10)
Lack of credit 1.4 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1)
Price variability 4.6 (5) 2.6 (2) 3.6 (3)
Low volumes 4.8 (3) 3.2 (3) 4.0 (3)
Lack of buyers 5.4 (4) 4.0 (4) 4.7 (4)
Low business skills 4.8 (6) 6.0 (6) 5.4 (6)
Low quality 7.2 (7) 6.2 (6) 6.7 (7)
Storage pests 7.6 (8) 7.6 (7) 7.6 (7.5)
Internal conflicts 8.0 (8) 8.2 (8) 8.1 (8)
Poor leadership 7.8 (9) 9.6 (10) 8.7 (9)
Lack of storage 11.3 (12) 8.2 (7) 9.4 (10)
Theft in storage 10.8 (11) 11.2 (12) 11.0 (11)
Figures in parentheses are medians; and n = number of PMGs.
Source: PMG survey 2005
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sustainability of their operations is not guaranteed in the long term. In addition, the size of loans may
be small to provide capital required for grain marketing. Selective subsidies may, however, be needed
to ‘kick-start’ agricultural markets as they play an important role in relieving critical seasonal and cash
constraints, and reducing market and input supply uncertainties (Dorward et al. 2004a).
In relation to contract or outgrower schemes, processors or exporters can provide financial resources
to farmers, with the latter undertaking to supply grain under conditions specified in advance (futures)
contracts that often specify volumes, prices and time. Farmer organizations and PMGs can play a vital
role in facilitating such contractual arrangements with the private sector in a manner that would be
mutually beneficial to farmers and contractors: farmers will be able to sell their produce through the
PMGs knowing that they will be paid promptly; the PMGs will be able to access capital from the
private sector that would improve the viability of their business; and the processor will be guaranteed
timely supply of required quantity and quality of grain. The viability of such an arrangement would
depend on three factors: i) how PMGs operate as a business, ii) the extent to which they would be
able to produce quality products in the desired quantity and time, and iii) the legal and institutional
framework for contract formation and enforcement. The latter is critical as many contract farming
arrangements suffer from non-binding contracts and lack of arbitration and enforcement mechanisms.
An inventory credit (also called warehouse credit) system is another option for providing credit
services to PMGs. There are three players involved in this arrangement: the farmer, the PMG and a
bank. The warehouse, which can also be operated by a PMG or a third party, can be used to store grain
supplied by farmers with a formal bank lending a certain percentage of the grain value at the time of
harvest. The PMG can use the loan to pay the farmers as well as acquire additional stocks with a plan
to repay the loan later after selling the grain at higher prices during the low supply season. This option
could be particularly attractive as the logistics are relatively simple and it is widely practiced in Africa.
However, the success of such an arrangement will depend on the requisite institutional mechanisms
which include the willingness of the banks to lend against inventories, warehouse systems that can
operate within the necessary legal framework, and supportive and enforceable legal institutions.
The challenge of price variability to collective marketing can be explained by supply variations and
weak market linkages. Reduced supply in rainfed agriculture is generally occasioned by low rainfall or
drought occurrences. Investment in water harvesting technologies (eg, watershed management) can
be a suitable strategy to mitigate supply variations and subsequent price fluctuations. While
unpredictable price fluctuations can be detrimental to collective efforts, seasonal price differences
associated with production and supply patterns may be predictable. The PMGs could turn such
seasonal price changes to their advantage by storing the grain until the prices are high. This can be
effectively done by the PMGs once the binding credit problem has been addressed through alternative
institutional arrangements. The challenge of low volumes requires a different strategy that would help
procure products over a wider catchment area. This requires coordination of marketing functions at a
higher level of organization (eg, a union of PMGs) that would also allow spreading of the
administrative and logistical costs. Economic viability of PMGs under changing market conditions will
also require improvements in business skills and entrepreneurship. This is particularly important at
the initial stages when such capacity is lacking. While private service providers may gradually take this
role as the PMGs grow, external support would be critical at initial stages to PMGs for training in
organization, management, entrepreneurship and marketing functions. The knowledge and skills
gained would equip the PMGs with the capacity to initiate and sustain profitable commercial
relationships with the private sector and financial institutions (Bingen et al. 2003).
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5. Legal and policy issues for collective marketing
Given the low level of market development and lack of service providers in many rural areas, the
PMGs are unlikely to prosper in a “business as usual” policy environment. An appropriate policy
environment that would spur PMG growth will include an enabling legal framework, support to access
market information, support to strengthen business skills, and access to essential finance and credit
facilities. As is the standard practice for rural groups in Kenya, the PMGs were registered as self-help
groups (SHGs) as required by the Kenyan law. Accordingly, the PMGs lack legal status as business
enterprises, which is likely to constrain their development and competitiveness under the liberalized
market structure. Their registration as social groups rather than business enterprises restricts access to
essential credit from formal financial institutions – a major collective marketing constraint identified
by the PMGs. Their lack of legal status as business enterprises means that they can neither sue nor be
sued in case of any liability. This drastically diminishes the incentive for financial institutions to do
business with PMGs in terms of providing essential financial services (credit, insurance, etc). Hence,
legal recognition as business entities is a prerequisite to place them in a better position for accessing
complimentary services which are critical for their development.
Moreover, agricultural marketing systems require rules and regulations that facilitate contract
formation and exchange. According to the Kenya Cooperative Societies amendment bill, Article 28,
2004, a cooperative society is required to have a committee of between five and nine members
(Republic of Kenya 2004)8. The committee is empowered to enter into contracts and carry out other
business functions in accordance with the established by-laws. Based on this article, the PMGs can
transit quickly from self help groups into cooperative. The act empowers the members to be
responsible for their own registered cooperative societies and stress on the need for the cooperatives,
through their elected committees, to run their societies in accordance with internationally accepted
cooperative principles. The relationship between societies and the government is through the
commissioner of cooperatives, who is responsible for the cooperative development and growth and
provides organization, registration, operation, advancement and dissolution services. Manyara (2003)
argues that government controls are justifiable to restore regulatory controls for the sector to be
sustainable, but Argwings-Kodhek (2004) contends that the amendments seem to be referring more
to a typical troubled agricultural marketing cooperative or generally a small rural crop marketing-
based cooperative. Nevertheless, the amended act would appear to provide for a stronger regulatory
framework within which cooperative societies can operate but it fails to provide sufficient mechanism
for those now registered as welfare groups to transit into cooperative societies. The strong regulatory
framework stipulated in the act without proper mechanisms for facilitating and supporting younger
cooperative societies and farmer organizations could also inhibit further development and
competitiveness.9
A framework that seeks to promote, guide and discipline the operation of markets may also be
required to enhance PMG operations. Typical examples will include laws dealing with good
agricultural practice, environmental and consumer protection to motivate corporate social
8 The supplement contains amendments to the Cooperatives Act No. 12 of 1997, which too was a result of an amendment of the
Cooperative Societies Cap. 490 of 1966. In an effort to enhance the policy and legal framework for the functioning of cooperatives, the
Kenyan government has gradually introduced these two amendments. The latest amendments were motivated by the need to enable
cooperative societies operate as business entities.
9 The framework requires that societies elect new office bearers annually, maintain financial statements that meet international standards
and prepare and submit annual statement of accounts audited by an auditor approved by the government. Failure to meet these
requirements or meet stated objectives may lead to dissolution.
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responsibility and accountability. Such a framework will need to address constraints to development
and sustainability of the PMGs based on their core function of collective marketing which will be
critical to their growth and effectiveness. As discussed earlier, low volumes, low business skills and
lack of storage facilities are some of the critical constraints to collective marketing. The low volume
problem is a further justification for the establishment of an umbrella union or confederation of
PMGs which can horizontally and vertically coordinate the marketing functions of the member
PMGs. This will be an essential strategy for the PMGs to reduce transaction costs while also reducing
their fixed administration costs through better vertical and horizontal coordination of output and
input marketing functions.
6. Conclusions
Market liberalization is a necessary but not sufficient condition to increase access to markets by
smallholder farmers in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The expected positive response by the
private sector in many areas with limited market infrastructure has however been disappointing,
leaving a large number of smallholder farmers under subsistence production and, therefore, unable to
benefit from liberalized markets. Structural problems of poor infrastructure and lack of market
institutions needed to fill the vacuum left when governments withdrew from markets in the process
of liberalization contribute to high transaction costs, coordination failure and pervasive market
imperfections. This realization has necessitated new kinds of institutional arrangements to enhance
the uptake of market-oriented and productivity-enhancing technologies, link farmers to markets and
foster market participation and commercialization of smallholder production. One of these
institutional innovations has been the strengthening of producer organizations and formation of
collective marketing groups as instruments to remedy pervasive market failures in rural economies.
The analysis presented here has shown that while collective action – embodied in PMGs – is feasible
and useful, external shocks and structural constraints in the system require farmer organization and
coordination mechanisms at a higher scale to exploit scale economies. Recurrent droughts in semi-arid
areas and low productivity of soils reduce marketable surplus and increase vulnerability and attenuate
the benefits of collective action. The continued existence of PMGs under such circumstances
depends on the ability to organize farmers at a higher level of coordination (eg, district), and their
ability to tackle technological and financial problems that now limit crop yields and the amount
procured in a given season.
It is evident that marketing channels in the study areas are characterized by long and complex
marketing chains and high transaction costs which considerably lower the farmers’ share of the
consumer price. Producer marketing groups have the potential to simplify and shorten the marketing
chain by directly connecting small producers to secondary and tertiary markets; better coordinate
production and marketing activities and facilitate farmer access to production inputs at fair prices.
Even so, only relatively successful PMGs will be able to exploit this potential. The effectiveness of
this collective action was reflected in the larger volumes of grain transacted and capital assets held by
the group. The effectiveness of collective action in terms of these performance indicators was found
to be a function of the level of collective action in the form of increased participatory decision making,
member contributions to the PMG, and initial start-up capital. Hence, better performing groups in
terms of collective marketing, showed evidence of high levels of collective action. The higher the
levels of collective action, the more successful the PMGs were in terms of monetized per capita assets
built over time and also the per capita grain volumes traded. The number of elections held, initial
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start-up capital and membership fees were all positively associated with group performance, while the
number of villages covered by the PMGs, distances to markets and group size seem to have the
opposite effect on group performance.
The challenge therefore is to sensitize members on the democratic principles of participatory group
governance through elections, to provide initial start-up capital to kick-start their operations, and to
encourage members to increase their registration fees for membership to raise the necessary
minimum capital. This calls for interventions that will improve governance and democratization of the
PMGs; solicit for external support in establishing a start-up capital base; and encourage increased
annual contributions to the PMGs by the membership. This will need to be coupled with training of
managers and possibly members of the PMGs in business skills to facilitate effectiveness and
accountability in running the PMGs as business enterprises. In addition the PMGs have to be
registered as legal business entities and not as self-help groups, which restricts their ability to access
essential business services.
Although the PMGs demonstrated that they could fill gaps in the marketing channels and pay better
prices to farmers, their effectiveness was hampered by their lack of cash capital to pay for produce
deliveries by farmers. The brokers and rural wholesalers who can pay cash on delivery were still
dominant market participants in rural grain markets. The PMGs on average required some five weeks
to pay the farmers after grain delivery. Cash constrained farmers find it very difficult to wait for that
long, even when the PMGs would eventually be in a position to pay prices significantly higher than
other buyers. Hence many small producers choose to sell their grain to other traders although this may
mean receiving lower prices. Therefore, until the PMGs are able to pay promptly for deliveries made
(even if it means a proportion of the final price) small producers will not be in a position to benefit
from market opportunities opened through collective action. There is thus a need to enhance the
ability of the PMGs to access working capital through access to financial credit. An innovative strategy
would be to use the PMG crop inventory before sale as collateral for financial credit and to
subsequently encourage formal financial institutions to extend warehouse or inventory credit services
to PMGs. This is critical to enable PMGs to overcome the binding liquidity constraints and facilitate
effective coordination of the marketing functions for small producers.
In addition to credit, experiences in eastern Kenya show that collective marketing activities are
constrained by low volumes, price variability and low business skills. The formation of an umbrella
union of PMGs may help in addressing the problems of low volumes, price variability and the lack of
credit. Low transacted volumes are attributed to delivering of small quantities of grain by producers.
This may be due to drought conditions, low productivity of traditional agriculture and weak incentives
to sell through PMGs. Moreover, the farmers are scattered over a wide area making coordination
costly and difficult. This calls for enhanced institutional arrangements for better vertical and
horizontal coordination of marketing functions according to manageable spatial units. A union of
PMGs (under an umbrella body) may ease the market coordination constraint, thus lowering
coordination costs. This option would enable PMGs to vertically coordinate transactions in addition to
facilitating access to a broad range of buyers at the upper end of the marketing chain. The seasonal
price variability may also be exploited through bulking and storage during periods of excess supply and
selling when prices improve as the supply diminishes. The alternative option for smoothing supply will
require investments in drought mitigating and water harvesting techniques that would enable farmers
in drought-prone areas manage production risk more effectively. External support for strengthening
existing institutions and collective investments in integrated watershed management may also
generate significant economic and environmental benefits to the affected communities.
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